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Abstract
Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents
with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a
bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an unde-
sired subset of the goods. Auction theory pro-
vides little guidance for dealing with this prob-
lem. We present a new family of decision-
theoretic bidding strategies that use probabilis-
tic predictions of final prices. We focus on self-
confirming price distribution predictions, which
by definition turn out to be correct when all
agents bid decision-theoretically based on them.
Bidding based on these is provably not optimal in
general, but our experimental evidence indicates
the strategy can be quite effective compared to
other known methods.
1 Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
A simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) (Cramton, 2005)
allocates a set of M related goods among N agents via sepa-
rate, concurrent English auctions for each good. Each auc-
tion may undergo multiple rounds of bidding. At any given
time, the bid price on good m is βm, defined to be the high-
est non-repudiable bid bm received thus far, or zero if there
have been no bids. To be admissible, a new bid must meet
the ask price, i.e., the bid price plus a bid increment (which
we take to be one w.l.o.g.), bmnew ≥ βm+1. If an auction re-
ceives multiple admissible bids in a given round, it admits
the highest (breaking ties arbitrarily). An auction is qui-
escent when a round passes with no new admissible bids.
Upon mutual quiescence, the auctions close and allocate
their respective goods per the last admitted bids.
Because no good is committed until all are, an agent’s bid-
ding strategy in one auction cannot be contingent on the
outcome for another. Thus, an active agent desiring a bun-
dle of goods runs the risk that it will purchase some but
not all goods in the bundle. This is known as the exposure
problem, and arises whenever agents have complementari-
ties among goods allocated through separate markets.
One approach to exposure is to design mechanisms that
take the complementarities directly into account, such as
combinatorial auctions (Cramton et al., 2005; de Vries and
Vohra, 2003), in which the auction mechanism determines
optimal packages based on agent bids over bundles. Al-
though such mechanisms may provide an effective solution
in some cases, there are often significant barriers to their
application (MacKie-Mason and Wellman, 2005).
We design bidding strategies to perform well despite expo-
sure risk. Let v(X) denote the value to a particular agent
of obtaining the set of goods X . Given that it obtains X at
prices p, the agent’s surplus is its value less the amount
paid, σ(X , p) ≡ v(X)−∑m∈X pm. The agent selects the
bundle that maximizes its surplus evaluated at its perceived
prices, pˆ:
X∗ = argmax
X
σ(X , pˆ). (1)
Each strategy we analyze is defined by how the agent con-
structs pˆ from its information state. Given that decision,
the agent bids bm = βm + 1 (the ask price) for the m ∈ X∗
that it is not already winning.
One example is the widely-studied straightforward bidding
(SB) strategy.1 An SB agent uses myopically perceived
prices: the bid price for goods it was winning in the pre-
vious round and the ask price for the others.
An agent has single-unit preference iff for all X , v(X) =
maxm∈X v({m}). For such agents, SB is a no regret pol-
icy (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000), as the agent would not
wish to change its bid even after observing what the other
agents did (Bikhchandani and Mamer, 1997). When all
agents have single-unit preference, and value every good
equally, the situation is equivalent to a problem in which
all buyers have an inelastic demand for a single unit of a
homogeneous commodity. For this problem, Peters and
1We adopt the terminology introduced by Milgrom (2000).
The same concept is also referred to as “myopic best response”,
“myopically optimal”, and “myoptimal” (Kephart et al., 1998).
Severinov (2001) showed that straightforward bidding is
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Up to a discretization er-
ror, the allocations from SAAs are efficient when agents
follow straightforward bidding. It can also be shown (Bert-
sekas, 1992; Wellman et al., 2001) that the final price vector
will differ from the minimum unique equilibrium price by
at most κ ≡ min(M,N). The value of the allocation, de-
fined to be the sum of the bidder surpluses, will differ from
the optimal by at most κ(1+κ). Unfortunately, these nice
properties do not generalize to other preferences. The final
SAA prices can differ from the minimum equilibrium price
vector, and the allocation value can differ from the opti-
mal, by arbitrarily large amounts (Wellman et al., 2001).
SB’s obliviousness to exposure can cause an agent to in-
cur significant losses in cases where these may have been
anticipated and avoided.
Despite the fact that markets for interdependent goods op-
erating simultaneously and independently are ubiquitous,
auction theory to date (Krishna, 2002) has little to say about
how one should bid in simultaneous markets with com-
plementarities. SAA-based auctions are even deliberately
adopted, despite awareness of strategic complications (Mil-
grom, 2000), for some markets that are expressly designed,
most famously the US FCC spectrum auctions starting in
the mid-1990s (McAfee and McMillan, 1996). Simulation
studies of scenarios based on the FCC auctions shed light
on some strategic issues (Csirik et al., 2001), as have ac-
counts of some of the strategists involved (Cramton, 1995;
Weber, 1997), but the general game is still too complex to
admit definitive strategic recommendations.
2 Background Research
We previously introduced two SB extensions to mitigate
the exposure problem in a market for scheduling resources
(MacKie-Mason et al., 2004; Reeves et al., 2005). First,
we modified SB to approximately account for sunk costs,
recognizing that goods an agent is already winning impose
no incremental costs if other agents do not submit addi-
tional bids (Reeves et al., 2005). We solved for settings
of a “sunk awareness” strategy parameter such that agents
playing pure or mixed forms of this strategy are in Nash
equilibrium. We identified qualitatively distinct equilib-
rium settings of this parameter corresponding to different
preference distributions.
Second, we allowed agents to select bundles based on pre-
dicted closing prices for each good (MacKie-Mason et al.,
2004). Performance depends on the specific price predic-
tion, so we defined strategies based on various methods for
predicting. We found that this approach is quite effective
compared to the strategies based on a sunk-awareness pa-
rameter, including SB.
We now extend point prediction-based strategies to em-
ploy probability distributions, and extend our notion of
self-confirming (SC) prediction to the case of probabil-
ity distributions. We also substantially improve our em-
pirical game analysis methodology, by developing tech-
niques to embrace large strategy sets without requiring ex-
haustive examination of the full combinatorial set of strat-
egy profiles. We then use our methodology to analyze a
broad range of strategies in multiple environments. The SC
distribution-based strategy—though not always optimal—
performs very well overall, and we argue it is likely to be
difficult to improve upon for general classes of SAAs.
3 Probabilistic Price Predictions
When an agent does not have single-unit preference, and
chooses to bid on a bundle of size > 1, it may face expo-
sure. If at any point the agent is bidding for a bundle X at
price such that ∑m∈Y bm > v(Y ) for some Y ⊂ X , the agent
is exposed. Exposure in an SAA is a direct tradeoff: bid-
ding on a needed good increases the prospects for complet-
ing a bundle, but also increases the expected loss in case the
full set of required goods cannot be acquired. A decision-
theoretic approach would account for these expected costs
and benefits, choosing to bid when the benefits prevail, and
cutting losses in the alternative.
Consider the M = N = 3 example presented in Table 3.
Agents 2 and 3 have single-unit preference. Agent 1 does
not, and indeed needs all three goods to obtain any value.
Table 1: An example of agent preferences.
Name v({1}) v({2}) v({3}) v({1,2,3})
Agent 1 0 0 0 15
Agent 2 8 6 5 8
Agent 3 10 8 6 10
If all three agents bid straightforwardly (SB), a possible
outcome is that agent 3 wins the first good at 7, agent 1
wins the second at 5, and agent 2 wins the third at 4. Here,
agent 1 is caught by the exposure problem, stuck with a
useless good and a surplus of−5.2 Agent 1 cannot do better
against SB bidders by continuing to bid on the first two
slots in this example. In general there is no known Bayes-
Nash optimal strategy for SAAs when agent preferences
exhibit complementarities, as do agent 1’s in Table 3. Thus
we focus on analyzing the performance of promising but
provably non-optimal strategies.
The effectiveness of a particular strategy will in general be
highly dependent on the characteristics of other agents in
the environment. Thus, we turn to strategies that employ
2Depending on the sequence of bidding (when asynchronous),
and the outcome of random tie-breaking (when synchronous) sev-
eral different outcomes are possible, with agents following SB. If
agent 1 bids at all, however, it ultimately ends up exposed, with
negative surplus.
preference distribution beliefs to guide bidding behavior,
rather than relying only on current price information as in
the SB strategy.
One natural use for preference distribution beliefs is to
form price predictions for the goods in an SAA. In the ex-
ample above, suppose agent 1 could predict with certainty
before the auctions start that the prices would total at least
16. Then it could conclude that bidding is futile, not partici-
pate, and avoid the exposure problem altogether. Of course,
agents will not in general make perfect predictions. How-
ever, we find that even modestly informed predictions can
significantly improve performance.
3.1 Bidding with price prediction
We now offer a straightforward way to modify SB with
price prediction information, and in the following subsec-
tions present two easy-to-compute strategies that are in-
stances of this approach.
Let Ω be the set of information available to an agent that
is relevant to predicting the prices of the M goods. Par-
tition Ω as (Ω0;B), where B is the t ×M history of bid
prices revealed by the SAA as of the tth round, and Ω0 is
information available to the agent prior to the auction. Let
F ≡ F (Ω0;B) denote a joint cumulative distribution func-
tion over final prices, representing the agent’s belief. We
assume that prices are bounded above by a known constant,
V . Thus, F associates cumulative probabilities with price
vectors in {1, . . . ,V}M .
We consider two ways to use prediction information to gen-
erate perceived prices differently from SB. In SB the agent
calculates the best bundle evaluated at myopic perceived
prices. We first define a point predictor for perceived
prices, pi, which anticipates possible exposure risks. Then
we define a distribution predictor for perceived prices,
∆ , which in addition adjusts for the degree to which the
agent’s current winning bids are likely to be sunk costs.3
3.2 Point price prediction
Suppose the agent has (at least) point beliefs about the final
prices that will be realized for each good. Let pi(Ω0;B) be
a vector of predicted final prices. Before the auction begins
the price predictors are pi(Ω0; /0), where /0 is the empty set
of bid information available pre-auction.
The SAA reveals the current quotes each round. Since the
auction is ascending, once the current bid price for good
m reaches βm, there is zero probability that the final price
pm will be less than βm. We define a simple updating rule
using this fact: the current price prediction for good m is
the maximum of the initial prediction and the myopically
3For both predictor strategies, if the agent has single-unit pref-
erence, it plays SB because that strategy is then no-regret.
perceived price:
pim(Ω0;B)≡
{
max(pim(Ω0; /0),βm) if winning m
max(pim(Ω0; /0),βm+1) otherwise.
Armed with these predictions, the agent chooses the goods
to bid on according to Equation 1 with pˆ ≡ pi(Ω0;B). We
denote a specific point price prediction strategy in this fam-
ily by PP(pix), where x labels particular initial prediction
vectors, pi(Ω0; /0).
3.3 Distribution-based price prediction
Strategies using additional information from the distribu-
tion F can at least weakly dominate strategies using only a
predictor of the final price distribution mean. We assume
the agent generates F (Ω0; /0), an initial, pre-auction belief
about the distribution of final prices.
As with the point predictor, we restrict the updating in our
distribution predictor to conditioning the distribution only
on the fact that prices must be bounded from below by β .
Let Pr(p | B) be the probability, according to F , that the
final price vector will be p, conditioned on the information
revealed by the auction, B. Then, with Pr(p | /0) as the pre-
auction initial prediction, we define:
Pr(p | B)≡

Pr(p | /0)
∑
q≥β
Pr(q | /0) if p ≥ β
0 otherwise.
(2)
(By x ≥ y we mean xi ≥ yi for all i.) For (2) to be well
defined for all possible β we define the price upper bounds
such that Pr(V, . . . ,V | /0)> 0.
We now use the distribution information to implement a
further decision-theoretic modification to SB. If an agent
is currently not winning a good and bids on it, then the ex-
pected incremental cost of winning the slot is the expected
final price, with the expectation calculated with respect to
the distribution F . If the agent is currently winning a good,
however, then the expected incremental cost of winning
that good depends on the likelihood that the current bid
price will be increased by another agent, so that the first
agent has to bid again to obtain the good. If, to the con-
trary, it keeps the good at the current bid, the full price
is sunk (already committed) and thus should not affect in-
cremental bidding. Based on this logic we define ∆m, the
expected incremental price for good m.
First, for simplicity we use only the information contained
in the vector of marginal distributions, (F1, . . . ,FM), as if
the final prices are independent across goods. Define the
expected final price conditional on the most recent vector
of bid prices, β :
EF(pm | β) =
V
∑
qm=βm
Pr(qm | βm)qm.
The expected incremental price depends on whether the
agent is currently winning good m. If not, then the low-
est final price at which it could is βm +1, and the expected
incremental price is simply the expected price conditional
on pm ≥ βm+1,
∆Lm ≡ EF(pm | βm+1)
=
V
∑
qm=βm+1
Pr(qm | βm+1)qm.
If the agent is winning good m, then the incremental price
is zero if no one outbids the agent. With probability 1−
Pr(βm | βm) the final price is higher than the current price,
and the agent is outbid with a new bid price βm +1. Then,
to obtain the good to complete a bundle, the agent will need
to bid at least βm+2, and the expected incremental price is
∆Wm = (1−Pr(βm | βm))
V
∑
qm=βm+2
Pr(qm | βm+2)qm.
The vector ∆ of expected incremental prices is constructed
by selecting ∆Lm or ∆Wm respectively for each m, depending
on whether the agent’s bid is currently winning. To select
the bundle on which it will bid, the agent evaluates Equa-
tion 1 with pˆ ≡ ∆ . We denote the strategy of bidding based
on a particular distribution predictor by PP(Fx), where x
labels various distribution predictors, F (Ω0; /0).
4 Self-Confirming Price Distributions
4.1 Definition and existence
An SAA environment comprises an SAA mechanism over
M goods, a set of N agents, and a probability distribution
over M-good value functions for each agent.
Definition 1 Let SE be an SAA environment. The predic-
tion F is a self-confirming price distribution for SE iff F
is the distribution of prices resulting when all agents play
bidding strategy PP(F ) in SE.
A prediction is approximately self-confirming if the defini-
tion above is satisfied for some approximate sense of equiv-
alence between the outcome and prediction distributions.
The key feature of self-confirming prices, of course, is that
agents make decisions based on predictions that turn out to
be correct with respect to the underlying probability distri-
bution. Since agents are optimizing for these predictions,
we might reasonably expect the strategy to perform well in
an environment where its predictions are confirmed.
The actual joint distribution will in general have dependen-
cies across prices for different goods. We are also inter-
ested in the situation in which if the agents play a strategy
based just on marginal distributions, that resulting distribu-
tion has the same marginals, despite dependencies.
Definition 2 Let SE be an SAA environment. The pre-
diction F = (F1, . . . ,FM) is a vector of self-confirming
marginal price distributions for SE iff for all m, Fm is the
marginal distribution of prices for good m resulting when
all agents play bidding strategy PP(F ) in SE.
Note that the confirmation of marginal price distributions
is based on agents using these predictions as if the prices
of goods were independent. However, we consider these
predictions confirmed in the marginal sense as long as the
results agree for each good separately, even if the joint out-
comes do not validate the independence assumption.
A natural question to raise at this point is whether self-
confirming predictions can actually be identified in plausi-
ble SAA environments. We demonstrate below that we can
often find approximately self-confirming marginal predic-
tions. However, it is easy to show that they cannot generally
exist, by invoking a particular case known to be difficult for
SAAs. Specifically, consider the M = N = 2 configuration
presented in Table 4.1, a common illustration of the ab-
sence of a competitive equilibrium (Cramton, 2005). There
exist no prices for goods 1 and 2 such that both agents opti-
mize their demands at the specified prices and the markets
clear.
Table 2: A configuration with no price equilibrium.
Name v({1}) v({2}) v({1,2})
Agent 1 0 0 30
Agent 2 20 20 20
Proposition 1 There exist SAA environments for which no
self-confirming or marginally self-confirming price distri-
butions exist.
Proof. Define an SAA corresponding to the configura-
tion of Table 4.1. Given a deterministic SAA mechanism
(one without asynchrony or random tie-breaking), for fixed
value functions the outcome from playing any profile of de-
terministic trading strategies is a constant. Thus, the only
possible self-confirming distributions (which were defined
for agents playing the deterministic PP(F ) strategies) must
assign probability one to the actual resulting prices. But
given such a prediction, our trading strategy will pursue
the agent’s best bundle at those prices, and must actually
get them since the prices are correct if the distribution is in-
deed self-confirming. But then the markets would all clear,
contrary to the fact that the predicted prices cannot consti-
tute an equilibrium, since such prices do not exist in this
instance. 2
Despite this negative finding, we conjecture that approxi-
mately self-confirming price distributions exist for a large
class of nondegenerate preference distributions, and can be
computed given a specification of the preference distribu-
tion. We now present a procedure for deriving such distri-
butions, and some evidence for its effectiveness.
4.2 Deriving self-confirming price distributions
Given an SAA environment—including the distributions
over agent preferences— we derive self-confirming price
distributions through an iterative simulation process. Start-
ing from an arbitrary prediction F0, we run many in-
stances of an SAA environment (sampling from the given
preference distributions) with all agents playing strategy
PP(F0).4 We record the resulting prices from each in-
stance, and designate the sample distribution observed by
F1. We then run another battery of instances, or itera-
tion, with agents playing PP(F1), and repeat the process
in this manner for some further series of iterations. If it
ever reaches an approximate fixed point, with F t ≈ F t+1
for some t, then we have statistically identified an approx-
imate self-confirming price distribution for this environ-
ment. (Due to sampling error, the approximate version of
the concept is the best we can attain through simulation.)
Any reasonable measure of similarity of probability distri-
butions combined with a threshold constitutes an operable
policy for validating approximate self-confirmation. We
employ the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic, defined
as the maximal distance between any two corresponding
points in the CDFs:
KS(F,F ′) = max
x
|F(x)−F ′(x)|.
When we seek self-confirmation only of predictors for
the marginal distributions, we measure KS distance sepa-
rately for each good, and take the largest value: KSmarg ≡
maxm KS(Fm,F ′m).
Our complete procedure for deriving approximate self-
confirming price distributions is defined by specifying:
1. a number of samples per iteration,
2. a threshold on KS or KSmarg on which to halt the iter-
ations and return a result,
3. a maximum number of iterations in case the threshold
is not met,
4. a smoothing parameter k designating a number of iter-
ations to average over when the procedure reaches the
maximum iterations without finding an approximate
fixed point.
The bound on the number of iterations ensures that this pro-
cedure terminates and returns a price distribution, which
may or may not be self-confirming. When this occurs, the
4In our experiments the initial prediction is zero prices, but our
results do not appear sensitive to this.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for a Self-confirming Price
Distribution Calculated in Six Iterations
Good Mean Price Standard Deviation
1 10.8 7.7
2 6.5 5.1
3 4.1 3.7
4 2.3 2.5
5 1.0 1.3
smoothing parameter avoids returning a distribution that is
known to cause oscillation. However, the apparent nonexis-
tence of a self-confirming equilibrium in this case suggests
the problem cannot be totally eradicated, and we do not ex-
pect the strategy to perform as well when the underlying
oscillations are large.
4.3 Trials of the iterative procedure
To illustrate the process, we specify an SAA scheduling
environment with five agents competing for five time slots.
An agent’s value function is defined by its job length and its
value for meeting various deadlines. We draw job lengths
randomly from U [1,5]. We choose deadline values ran-
domly from U [1,50] then prune to impose monotonicity;
for details see Reeves et al. (2005). We set the algorithm
parameters at one million games per iteration, and a 0.01
KS convergence criterion.5 We ran the algorithm, play-
ing the million games per iteration to generate an empiri-
cal price distribution. The predicted and empirical distribu-
tions quickly converged, with a KS statistic of 0.007 after
only six iterations. We report descriptive statistics for the
result in Table 3.
To see if our method produces useful results with some
regularity, we applied it to 22 additional instances of the
scheduling problem, varying the numbers of agents and
goods, and the preference distributions. We again drew
deadline values from U [1,50] and pruned them for mono-
tonicity. We used two probability models for job lengths
in the first 21 instances. In the uniform model, they are
drawn from U [1,M]. In the exponential model job length λ
has probability 2−λ, for λ = 1, . . . ,M− 1, and probability
2−(M−1) when λ = M.
We constructed 10 instances of the uniform model, com-
prising various combination of 3 ≤ N ≤ 9 and 3 ≤M ≤ 7.
In each case, our procedure found self-confirming marginal
price distributions (KS threshold 0.01) within 11 iterations.
Similarly, for 11 instances of the exponential model, with
the number of agents and goods varying over the same
range, we found SC distributions within seven iterations.
We plot the distribution of KS values from these 21 in-
5Since KS is a distance between CDFs, a 0.01 threshold is
equivalent to a maximal one percentage point probability differ-
ence at any point in the two distributions.
0 10 20 30 40 500.001
0.01
0.1
1
Iterations
KS
 S
ta
tis
tic
s 
fo
r 2
1 
En
vir
on
m
en
ts
Median
Mean
Maximum
Figure 1: Convergence of iterative SC price estimation.
stances in Figure 1.
The 22nd instance was designed to be more challenging:
we used the N = M = 2 example with fixed preferences
described in Table 4.1. Since there exists no SC distribu-
tion, our algorithm did not find one, and as expected after
a small number of iterations it began to oscillate among a
few states indefinitely. After reaching the limit of 100 iter-
ations, our algorithm returned as its prediction distribution
the average over the last k = 10.
5 Empirical Game Analysis
We now analyze the performance of self-confirming distri-
bution predictors in a variety of SAA environments, against
a variety of other strategies. We use methods developed in
our prior work (Reeves et al., 2005; MacKie-Mason et al.,
2004), and related to recent studies in a similar empirical
vein (Armantier et al., 2000; Kephart et al., 1998; Walsh
et al., 2002).
5.1 Environments and strategy space
We studied SAAs applied to market-based scheduling
problems, as described in Section 4.2. Particular environ-
ments are defined by specifying the number M of goods,
the number N of agents, and a preference model compris-
ing probability distributions over job lengths and deadline
values. The bulk of our computational effort went into
an extensive analysis of one particular environment, the
N = M = 5 uniform model presented above. As described
in Section 5.2, the empirical game for this setting provides
much evidence supporting the unique strategic stability of
PP(FSC). We complement this most detailed trial with
smaller empirical games for a range of other scheduling-
based SAA environments. Altogether, we studied selected
environments with uniform, exponential, and fixed distri-
butions for job lengths; a modified uniform distribution
for deadline values; and agents in 3 ≤ N ≤ 8; goods in
3≤M ≤ 7.
To varying degrees, we analyzed the interacting perfor-
mance of 53 different strategies. These were drawn from
the three strategy families described above: SB, point pre-
dictor, and distribution predictor. For each family we var-
ied a defining parameter to generate the different specific
strategies.6 The choice of strategies was based on prior ex-
perience, though we make no claim that we covered all rea-
sonable variations. Naturally, our emphasis is on evaluating
the performance of PP(FSC) in combination with the other
strategies. One of the noteworthy alternatives is PP(FSB),
which employs the price distribution prediction formed by
estimating (through simulation) the prices resulting from
all agents playing SB.
We use Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the payoff func-
tion for our empirical game, which maps profiles of agent
strategies to expected payoffs for each agent. Given N
agents and S possible strategies, the symmetric game com-
prises
(N+S−1
N
)
distinct strategy profiles. In our primary
example with five agents, there are over four million dif-
ferent strategy profiles to evaluate. Since we determine the
expected payoffs empirically for each profile by running
millions of simulations of the auction protocol, estimating
the entire payoff function is infeasible. However, we can
estimate the complete payoff matrix for various subsets of
our 53 strategies. As we describe below, we do not need
the full payoff matrix to reach conclusions about equilibria
in the 53-strategy game.
5.2 5×5 uniform environment
The largest empirical SAA game we have constructed is for
the SAA scheduling environment discussed in Section 4.2,
with five agents, five goods, and uniform distributions over
job lengths and deadline values. We have estimated payoffs
for 4916 strategy profiles, out of the 4.2 million distinct
combinations of 53 strategies. Payoff estimates are based
on an average of 10 million samples per profile (though
some profiles were simulated for as few as 200 thousand
games, and some for as many as 200 million). Despite the
sparseness of the estimated payoff function (covering only
0.1% of possible profiles), we obtained several results.
First, as discussed above, we conjectured that the self-
confirming distribution predictor strategy, PP(FSC), would
perform well. We directly verified this: the profile where all
five agents play a pure PP(FSC) strategy is a Nash equilib-
rium in the game restricted to 53 strategies. No unilateral
deviation to any of the other 52 pure strategies is profitable.
To verify a pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium (all agents
playing s) for N players and S strategies, one needs pay-
offs for only S profiles: one for each strategy playing with
6To conserve space, we have an appendix available upon re-
quest with a full description of the 53 strategies here. An appendix
is in preparation, to provide specification of all the parameters, in-
cluding description of the prediction methods used for point and
distribution predictors.
N−1 copies of s. The symmetric profile is an equilibrium
if there are no profitable deviation profiles (i.e., obtained
by changing the strategy of one player to obtain a higher
payoff given the others).
The fact that PP(FSC) is pure symmetric Nash for this
game does not of course rule out the existence of other
Nash equilibria. Indeed, without evaluating any particular
profile, we cannot eliminate the possibility that it represents
a (non-symmetric) pure-strategy equilibrium itself. How-
ever, the profiles we did estimate provide significant addi-
tional evidence, including the elimination of broad classes
of potential symmetric mixed equilibria.
Let us define a strategy clique as a set of strategies for
which we estimated payoffs for all combinations. Each
clique defines a subgame, for which we have complete pay-
off information. Within our 4916 profiles we have eight
maximal cliques, all of which include strategy PP(FSC).
For each of these subgames, PP(FSC) is the only strategy
that survives iterated elimination of (strictly) dominated
(pure) strategies. It follows that PP(FSC) is the unique
(pure or mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium in each of these
clique games. We can further conclude that in the full 53-
strategy game there are no mixed strategy equilibria with
support contained within any of the cliques, other than the
special case of the pure-strategy PP(FSC) equilibrium.
We can show that PP(FSC) is the only small-support mixed
strategy, among the two-strategy cliques for which we have
calculated payoffs, that is even an approximate equilib-
rium. Of the
(52
2
)
= 1326 pairs of strategies not includ-
ing PP(FSC), we have all profile combinations for 46. For
these we obtained a lower bound of 0.32 on the value of ε
such that a mixture of one of these pairs constitutes an ε-
Nash equilibrium. In other words, for any symmetric pro-
file defined by such a mixture, an agent can improve its pay-
off by a minimum of 0.32 through deviating to some other
pure strategy. For reference, the payoff for the all-PP(FSC)
profile is 4.51, so this represents a nontrivial difference.
Finally, for each of the 4916 evaluated profiles, we can de-
rive a bound on the ε rendering the profile itself an ε-Nash
pure-strategy equilibrium. The three most strategically sta-
ble profiles by this measure (i.e., lowest potential gain from
deviation, ε) are:
1. all PP(FSC): ε = 0 (confirmed Nash equilibrium)
2. one PP(FSB), four PP(FSC): ε > 0.13
3. two PP(FSB), three PP(FSC): ε > 0.19
The remaining profiles have ε > 0.25.
Our conclusion from these observations is that PP(FSC) is
a highly stable strategy within this strategic environment,
and likely uniquely so. Of course, only limited inference
can be drawn from even an extensive analyis of only one
particular distribution of preferences.
5.3 Self-confirming prediction in other environments
To test whether the strong performance of PP(FSC) gen-
eralizes across other SAA environments, we undertook
smaller versions of this analysis on variations of the model
above. Specifically, we explored 17 additional instances of
the market-based scheduling problem: eight each with the
uniform (U) and exponential (E) models (3–8 agents, 3–7
goods), and one with fixed preferences, corresponding to
the counterexample model of Table 4.1.
For each we derived self-confirming price distributions
(failing in the last case, of course), as reported in Sec-
tion 4.3. We also derived price vectors and distributions
for the other prediction-based strategies. For 11 of the en-
vironments (eight U and three E), we evaluated 27 profiles:
one with all PP(FSC), and for each of 26 other strategies
s, one with N− 1 agents playing PP(FSC) and one agent
playing s. We ran between two and ten million games per
profile in all of these environments.
For each of these 11 U and E models, we identified the
seven best responses to others playing PP(FSC) (which in-
variably included PP(FSC) itself). To economize on simu-
lation time, for the other five E environments we used the
seven best responses found for the most similar of the sim-
ulated E environments. We then evaluated all profiles in-
volving these strategies (i.e., a 7-clique) in the for each of
the 16 environments, based on at least 340,000 samples per
profile.
We summarize our results for U and E models in Table 4.
We first report the percentage gain for a participant that de-
viates from all-PP(FSC) to the best of the 26 other strate-
gies. (This is the value of ε from an ε-Nash equilibrium as
a percent of the average payoff from all-PP(FSC) play.) To
adjust for the sampling error in our method, we report in
the second column the average percentage gain from devi-
ation when we bootstrap a sample of 30 observations from
a normal distribution with the payoff mean and variance
we observed in our simulations. Using the same sampling
distribution, we calculate the probability that all-PP(FSC)
is a Nash equilibrium. Finally, for each environment with
N ≤ 6 we used replicator dynamics to find a mixed strategy
equilibrium for the 7-clique, and report the probability that
an agent plays PP(FSC) in this Nash equilibrium.
In 15 out of these 16 environments, PP(FSC) was verified
to be an ε-Nash equilibrium for anε less than 2% of the av-
erage payoff. That is, no single agent could gain as much as
2% by deviating. The worst performance by PP(FSC) is in
environment U(7,8), for which a strategy deviation could
improve expected payoff by only 5%. Further, our results
are quite insensitive to sampling error induced by our simu-
Table 4: Performance of All-PP(FSC) as a Candidate Equilibrium for Various U and E Environments
Env(M,N) Percentage gain Percentage gain Probability all-PP(FSC) Mixed-strategy
from one-player adjusted for is exact Nash probability of
deviation sampling error equilibrium playing PP(FSC)
E(3,3) 0 0 1.00 1.00
E(3,5) 0 .09 .600 .996
E(3,8) .83 .85 0 —
E(5,3) 0 0 1.00 .999
E(5,5) 0 .01 .900 .998
E(5,8) .60 .64 0 —
E(7,3) 0 .06 .667 .992
E(7,6) .04 .10 .567 .549
U(3,3) 1.24 1.26 0 .725
U(3,5) 0 0 1.00 1.00
U(3,8) .56 .53 0 —
U(5,3) 1.35 1.35 0 .809
U(5,8) 1.59 1.62 0 —
U(7,3) .81 .84 0 .942
U(7,6) .52 .52 0 .929
U(7,8) 4.98 4.94 0 —
lation method. The sampling-adjusted percentage gain val-
ues are never significantly higher, and in every environment
for which we have a mixed-strategy equilibrium, PP(FSC)
appears with substantial if not overwhelming probability.
Overall, we regard this as favorable evidence for the
PP(FSC) strategy across the range of market-based
scheduling environments. Not surprisingly, the environ-
ment with fixed preferences is an entirely different story.
Recall that in this case the iterative procedure failed to find
a self-confirming price distribution, and the averaged dis-
tribution computed by our algorithm provides a quite in-
accurate prediction. For this environment we evaluated all
53 profiles with at least one agent playing PP(FSC). The
self-confirming prediction strategy performed poorly, gen-
erally obtaining negative payoffs regardless of other strate-
gies. Since one available strategy is to simply not trade,
PP(FSC) is clearly not a best-response player in this envi-
ronment.
6 Discussion
Our proposed trading strategy for SAA environments with
complementarities places bids based on probabilistic pre-
dictions of final good prices. Like the approach of Green-
wald and Boyan (2004), our policy tackles the exposure
problem head-on, by explicitly weighing the risks and ben-
efits of placing bids on alternative bundles, or no bundle
at all. The specific strategy generalizes our previous work
on bidding based on point price predictions, and like that
scheme is parametrized by the method for generating pre-
dictions. By explicitly conditioning on context (e.g., pref-
erence distributions), such trading strategies are potentially
robust across varieties of SAA environments.
The strategy we consider most promising employs what we
call self-confirming price distributions. A price distribution
is self-confirming if it reflects the prices generated when
all agents play the trading strategy based on this distribu-
tion. Although such self-confirming distributions may not
always exist, we expect they will (at least approximately) in
many environments of interest, especially those character-
ized by relatively diffuse uncertainty and a moderate num-
ber of agents. An iterative simulation algorithm appears
effective for deriving such distributions.
Given the analytic and computational intractability of the
game induced by an SAA environment, we evaluated our
approach using an empirical game-theoretic methodology.
We explored a restricted strategy space including a range
of candidate strategies identified in prior work. Despite the
infeasibility of exhaustively exploring the profile spaces,
our analyses support several game-theoretic conclusions.
The results provide favorable evidence for our favored
strategy—very strong evidence in one environment we in-
vestigated intensely, and somewhat less categorical evi-
dence for a range of variant environments.
Neither the strategy we present here nor any other strategy
is likely to be universally best across SAA environments.
Nevertheless, our results establish the self-confirming price
prediction strategy as the leading contender for dealing
broadly with the exposure problem. If agents make opti-
mal decisions with respect to prices that turn out to be right,
there may not be room for performing a lot better. On the
other hand, there are certainly areas where improvement
should be possible, for example:
• accounting for one’s own effect on prices, as in strate-
gic demand reduction (Weber, 1997)
• incorporating price dependencies with reasonable
computational effort
• more graceful handling of instances without self-
confirming price distributions
• timing of bids: trading off the risk of premature qui-
escence with the cost of pushing prices up
We intend to explore some of these opportunities in our
continuing research.
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